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NOTES

Surviving an Immigration Marriage
Fraud Investigation
ALL YOU NEED IS LOVE, LUCK, AND TIGHT
PRIVACY CONTROLS
INTRODUCTION
Married couples anxiously awaiting interviews with an
immigration officer are assured “all you need is love.”1 They are
told not to worry—a fraud interview should not cause concern if
their marriage is bona fide.2 But any couple that has blindly
walked into an interview that will determine the validity of its
marriage soon discovers the stakes are too high to heed such
flippant advice. It is becoming clearer that what couples really
need is not love, but luck—and a traditionally palatable marriage.
Consider the story of Saïd and Patricia.3 After fourteen
years together, two children, and a dog, they made the mistake
of assuming that the legitimacy of their marriage would be as
obvious to an immigration official as it was to them; they did
not see the need to hire an attorney. Patricia, a U.S. citizen,
sponsored Saïd’s petition for citizenship. Some months later,
much to the couple’s dismay, they received a letter from the
federal government that expressed its dissatisfaction with the
petition and its need for further information. The distressed
couple was subsequently scheduled for an investigatory
interview into their marriage. They presumed this initial
setback could be attributed to clerical error and once they could
1

Nina Bernstein, Do You Take This Immigrant?, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2010,

at MB1.
2

Id.
This narrative is illustrative of the spousal-petitioning process conducted
without the aid of an attorney. The names and any resemblance to actual persons,
living or dead, events, or places are purely coincidental.
3

709

710

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:2

present their case in person, all would be resolved. Instead, the
interview was a “Kafkaesque version of ‘The Newlywed Game’”
with none of the flashy prizes, but all the risks for marital
discord.4 Indeed, due to discrepancies in their answers to
questions such as the color of Patricia’s toothbrush or the
amount paid on their last electricity bill, they failed their fraud
interview5 and their petition was denied. The gravity of their
ill-placed faith in the system was soon realized—Saïd was put
in removal proceedings.
Ironically, couples like Patricia and Saïd—stalwart
believers in the strength of their union—suffer the consequences
of their convictions while those couples that have something to
hide realize the necessity6 of retaining an immigration attorney.
An attorney would have coached them on the specific documents
to bring to their fraud interview and the questions to expect,
ranging from the absurd to the invasive.7 Furthermore, an
attorney would have conducted mock interviews, questioning the
couple separately, as is often done in marriage fraud interviews
to assure their answers match.8 Yet even a seasoned
immigration attorney may not be able to prepare the couple for
the newest line of questioning by the United States Citizenship
and Immigration Services (USCIS): “Why aren’t you listed as ‘In
a relationship’ on Facebook?”

4

Bernstein, supra note 1, at MB1. The Newlywed Game is an American
game show premised on determining how well newlyweds know each other. The
Newlywed Game, WIKIPEDIA, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Newlywed_Game (last
visited Sept. 30, 2011). The competition pits recently married couples against each
other for the highest number of matching answers to rounds of personal questions
about their respective spouses. Id. According to some accounts, the show led to many
marital arguments and even divorce. Id.
5
Fraud interview procedures, including the number of rounds conducted, vary
across states. See generally Chapter 15 Interviewing, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES,
http://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/AFM/HTML/AFM/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-2449.html (last visited
Sept. 30, 2011).
6
Jean Pierre Espinoza, Ineffective Assistance of Counsel in Removal
Proceedings Matter of Compean and the Fundamental Fairness Doctrine, 22 FLA. J. INT’L
L. 65, 66 (2010) (“The complexity of immigration law and the deportation process
emphasizes the need for counsel . . . .”). Aliens have the right to counsel, but not at the
expense of the government. 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (2006); see also Donald Kerwin, Revisiting the
Need for Appointed Counsel, INSIGHT, Apr. 2005, at 1, 16-17, available at
http://www.migrationpolicy.org/insight/Insight_Kerwin.pdf (concluding that an appointedcounsel system would better serve government interests).
7
Immigration lawyers present at fraud interviews have reported questions
that address subject matter ranging from the last movie the couple saw together to the
last time they had sex. See Nina Bernstein, Could Your Marriage Pass the Test?, N.Y.
TIMES (June 11, 2010, 8:45 PM), http://cityroom.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/11/marriagetest/?ref=nyregion; Bernstein, supra note 1, at MB1.
8
See, e.g., Bernstein, supra note 1, at MB1.
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The U.S. government is establishing a growing presence
on social networking sites,9 both through stated public policy
and internal law enforcement strategy.10 Stories of law
enforcement officials tracking down wanted criminals through
the use of clues left on social networking sites have been well
documented by the news media.11 Recently, however, USCIS
documents released in a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
request reveal a much more disturbing reality—the United
States government is operating under a presumption of fraud,
trolling social networking sites on its own initiative without
first having reason to suspect a couple of deception.12
The intrusive nature of the inquiry into the marital
relationship exposes couples whose relationships fall outside of
the societal norm to what is, at best, an invasion of privacy,
and, at worst, an erosion of liberty. Part I of this note argues
that the congressional call for stricter policies in the marital
immigration context was a result of exaggerated estimates of
marriage fraud and represented a departure from longstanding
policies favoring familial reunification. This divergence
produced a piece of legislation, the Immigration Marriage
Fraud Amendments of 1986, which unnecessarily burdened
newlywed couples with bureaucratic hurdles. Part II assesses
the interplay between family law and immigration law,
emphasizing the latitude accorded Congress in the latter
context at the expense of the autonomy normally granted the
former. Part III traces the history of the legal definition of
“family,” and its influence on immigration regulation. The
legally preferred formulation of the nuclear family is then
contrasted with current demographics to illustrate the
normative implications resulting from this incongruence.
9

For the purposes of this note, “social networking sites” and “social media”
will both refer to current top-trafficked “sharing” sites: Facebook, Twitter, and Flickr.
See infra note 123 and accompanying text.
10
See Memorandum from U.S. Citizenship & Immigration Servs. on Social
Networking Sites (May 2008) (released to Electronic Frontier Foundation in FOIA
request) [hereinafter Memorandum].
11
See Julie Masis, Is This Lawman Your Facebook Friend?, BOS. GLOBE (Jan.
11, 2009), http://www.boston.com/news/local/articles/2009/01/11/is_this_lawman_your_
facebook_friend/?page=1; Colin Moynihan, Arrest Puts Focus on Protesters’ Texting,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 5, 2009, at A19; Gene Johnson, Fraud Fugitive Busted After Unwise Friend
Request, SEATTLE TIMES (Oct. 13, 2009, 2:46 PM), http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/
html/localnews/2010056979_webfacebook13m.html; Editorial, Twitter Tapping, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 13, 2009, at WK8.
12
Jennifer Lynch, Applying for Citizenship? U.S. Citizenship and
Immigration Wants to Be Your “Friend”, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND. (Oct. 12,
2010), http://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2010/10/applying-citizenship-u-s-citizenship-and.
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This note will further explore how the implementation
of the federal government’s policies against U.S. citizen–
spouses of immigrant-hopefuls compromises privacy rights
while imposing unrealistic and outdated notions of the
traditional American family. Part IV highlights the new brand
of investigatory methods the government is using to ferret out
“sham” marriages, specifically through social media. This
section exposes the ease with which government actors can
access personal information by way of deception, but also as a
fault of the design of the social networking system. Part V
considers and evaluates the ways in which these practices may
compromise the constitutionally guaranteed privacy rights of
American citizen spouses. Part VI draws parallels to emerging
technologies and identifies the consequent privacy concerns
that continue to reshape and redefine the scope of Fourth
Amendment protection. Finally, the shortcomings of the
current system of evaluating and detecting sham marriages are
reviewed. Additionally, the conclusion suggests ways in which
procedures could be improved in order to preserve citizen
spouses’ constitutional rights to privacy while increasing
government transparency.
I.

THE ENACTMENT OF THE IMMIGRATION MARRIAGE
FRAUD AMENDMENTS OF 1986

United States immigration policy has long touted the
importance of familial, and especially spousal, reunification.13 To
wit, “immediate relatives” of United States citizens are granted a
categorical exemption from numerical limitations on entry.14
Immediate relatives are statutorily defined as the children,
spouses, and parents of United States citizens.15 Yet at some point
in the development of federal immigration policy, the laudable
goal of family reunification was abandoned in the effort to combat
the perceived growing threat of fraudulent entry through
marriage.16 This shift in policy and attitude was most readily
13

See, e.g., Kerry Abrams, Immigration Law and the Regulation of Marriage,
91 MINN. L. REV. 1625, 1638 (2007) (“Immigration law uses marriage as a category for
assigning immigration status and does this as part of an explicit policy goal of family
unification.”).
14
8 U.S.C. § 1151(b)(2)(A)(i) (2006).
15
Id.
16
The report reads,
Historically, U.S. immigration policy has recognized the importance of
protecting nuclear families from separation by permitting immediate family
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reflected by the passage of the Immigration Marriage Fraud
Amendments of 1986 (IMFA or Amendments),17 a successor to the
Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) of 1952.18
A.

Marriage Fraud Is Everywhere, Yet Nowhere to Be
Found: An Irrational Fear of Sham Marriages

Under the heading “Need for Legislation,” a House
Report on the IMFA reported that “[s]urveys conducted by the
Immigration and Naturalization Service have revealed that
approximately thirty percent of all petitions for immigrant
visas involve suspect marital relationships.”19 Presented with
these worrying figures, it is no wonder Congress called for
measures to curb the “significant problem in the
administration of the immigration laws.”20 Since the passage of
the IMFA, however, that figure has been generally regarded as
a gross exaggeration.21
Congress reasoned that fraudulent schemes to obtain
immigration benefits were more likely to occur in marriages
celebrated shortly before immigration.22 Thus, as an added
precaution, the Amendments impose a two-year conditionalstatus waiting period on alien spouses of U.S. citizens and
permanent residents before they are able to petition for
permanent residency.23 The applicable section defines “alien
spouses” eligible for permanent status, yet subject to
conditional status, as those who were “lawfully admitted for
permanent residence, by virtue of a marriage which was
members of U.S. citizens to immigrate to the United States without numerical
limitation. . . . Because of this special status . . . [aliens] frequently find it
expedient to engage in a fraudulent marriage in order to side step the
immigration law.
H.R. REP. NO. 99-906 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5978, 5978.
17
Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-639,
100 Stat. 3537 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 8 U.S.C.); see also AUSTIN
T. FRAGOMEN, JR. ET AL., IMMGR. L. & BUS. § 3:22 (2010).
18
Immigration and Nationality Act, ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as
amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-1537 (2006)).
19
H.R. REP. NO. 99-906 (1986), reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5978, 5978.
20
Id. at 5980 (statement of Hon. Peter W. Rodino, Jr.).
21
James A. Jones, The Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments: Sham
Marriages or Sham Legislation?, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 679, 699 (1997) (“[T]he thirtypercent figure was only based upon the number of cases that field investigators in
[three] cities suspected were fraudulent; they were not cases where actual fraud has
been proven. In fact, the INS had never determined the exact number of cases of
known fraud before Congress enacted the IMFA.”).
22
Abrams, supra note 13, at 1683.
23
8 U.S.C. § 1186a(a)(1); see also FRAGOMEN, JR. ET AL., supra note 17.
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entered into less than 24 months before the date the alien
obtains such status by virtue of such marriage.”24 The alien
spouse can subsequently remove the conditional limitations on
residence by jointly filing a second petition (Form I-751)
starting ninety days prior to the second anniversary of the
grant of conditional residence status.25 Failure to timely file can
result in an automatic termination of the conditional status, as
well as the initiation of deportation proceedings.26
B.

Sanctions on Marriage for an “Improper Purpose”

Supplemental to the petition, the couple must also
provide documentation proving that the marriage was not
entered into for the improper purpose of evading U.S.
immigration law.27 Termination of the alien spouse’s conditional
residence status by the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) can occur at any time during the two-year conditional
period provided that the “qualifying marriage” had as its
purpose the procurement of an alien’s admission as an
immigrant.28 Conditional residence status can also be removed
if the marriage had been judicially annulled or terminated—
other than through the death of a spouse29—or if a fee or other

24

8 U.S.C. § 1186a(g)(1)(C).
Id. § 1186a(d)(2)(A); FRAGOMEN, JR. ET AL., supra note 17.
26
8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(2)(A). Regulations require that the USCIS notify alien
spouses of the filing of the second petition when they first acquire conditional resident
status and at the beginning of the ninety day period in which to file. 8 C.F.R.
§ 216.2(a)-(b) (2010). However, the next section within the provision specifically places
the responsibility of filing with the alien and petitioning spouse and does not relieve
them of the burden of filing should the USCIS fail to provide one, or even both, of the
notifications. Id. § 216.2(c). Therefore, the alien and petitioning spouse would not fulfill
their burden of showing “good cause” for failing to jointly file Form I-751 within the
required time period due to lack of notice by the USCIS. Id.; see also FRAGOMEN, JR. ET
AL., supra note 17.
27
For the purpose of offering proof that a marriage was not entered into to
defraud the United States government, the USCIS asks for paperwork it views as being
indicative of the bona fides of a marriage. 8 C.F.R. § 216.4(a)(5).
25

Documentation [can include] showing joint ownership of property; Lease
showing joint tenancy of a common residence; Documentation showing
commingling of financial resources; Birth certificates of children born to the
marriage; Affidavits of third parties having knowledge of the bona fides of the
marital relationship, or Other documentation establishing that the marriage
was not entered into in order to evade the immigration laws of the United
States.
Id.
28
29

8 U.S.C. § 1186a(b)(1)(A)(i).
Id. § 1186a(b)(1)(A)(ii).
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consideration were given.30 The most obvious punishment for
evading U.S. immigration laws through marriage fraud is
deportation of the alien spouse.31 But the increased
criminalization of immigration-related activities32—in conjunction
with the increased bureaucratic regulation of immigration
benefits—places both parties at risk of criminal sanctions, which
can include terms of imprisonment, fines, and forfeiture of
property.33 In practice, however, criminal law has been
disproportionately used against aliens instead of citizens and
permanent residents.34 Nonetheless, attempting to structure
federal criminal sanctions around a concept as amorphous as the
American marriage is futile and inefficient.35 That same argument
can theoretically apply to all federal immigration regulations that
rest on notions of a traditional American marriage—especially
when, as the following sections explore, reality is incongruous
with the norms Congress imposes.
II.

TESTING CONGRESSIONAL REGULATION OF MARRIAGE AT
THE INTERSECTION OF FAMILY LAW

While not considered a branch of family law,
immigration law heavily influences familial relationships
through its regulations.36 Additionally, while marriage and
family law have traditionally been matters reserved to the
states, the federal government ultimately determines what
constitutes a valid marriage “for immigration purposes.”37
Congressional action and Supreme Court jurisprudence have
shaped the immigrant relationship in ways that not only
diverge from current cultural norms, but also fail to align with

30

Id. § 1186a(b)(1)(B).
Id. § 1227(a)(1)(G).
32
See generally Maria Isabel Medina, The Criminalization of Immigration
Law: Employer Sanctions and Marriage Fraud, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. 669 (1997)
(arguing that “criminal sanctions are inappropriate as a method of deterring United
States citizens or permanent residents” from using marriage as a means to evade
immigration laws).
33
Id. at 676.
34
Id. at 674.
35
Id. at 699-700 (“But the nature of the marriage relationship between two
consenting adults is too private, too elusive, and too subjective to be defined in the
public sphere in a way that obligates the parties to meet certain public expectations
defined not by moral, social or religious communities but by a political community—the
sovereign, and to act in particular ways under threat of criminal sanctions.”).
36
Abrams, supra note 13, at 1629.
37
Id. at 1670 (“Immigration law has its own prerequisites for who may enter
a valid marriage, which in some ways track state law and in others supersede it.”).
31
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state policies.38 The IMFA is but one example of the federal
government’s prominence in defining marriage in the
immigration setting. Judicial tests developed over the years to
parse the bona fides of a marriage often pit family and
immigration law against each other; courts are reluctant to
allow governmental intrusion into the familial sphere yet are
permissive of governmental regulation of immigration matters.39
Thus, a brief overview of the treatment of marriage in the
immigration context is necessary to understand the complex
dynamic40 that exists between immigration and family law.
A.

Congressional Power as Primary

Matters of naturalization are generally regarded to be
legislative functions41 superseding the role of the judiciary.42
Indeed, Congress’s plenary power over immigration is so
sweeping that the Supreme Court has upheld numerous
restrictions of aliens’ “rights” that would be untenable if applied
to American citizens.43 In the name of immigration regulation,
Congress can pass laws that are overtly discriminatory toward
nonresident aliens without fear of a successful constitutional
challenge—aliens are not a “protected class,” so they are not
entitled to the same constitutional guarantees as American

38

See, e.g., id. at 1634 (“In contrast to state family law, the federal
immigration system passes judgment on and influences decision making in marriages
involving immigrants throughout the four stages of marriage: courtship, entry, intact
marriage, and exit.”).
39
Jennifer M. Chacón, Loving Across Borders: Immigration Law and the
Limits of Loving, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 345, 348-49; see also Abrams, supra note 13, at
1633 (“[Family] law not only suspects that intervention will do harm; it doubts that
intervention will do good . . . .”).
40
Abrams, supra note 13, at 1646 (“Immigration law thus places Congress
and those it regulates in an unusual position. Congress has atypically broad power to
regulate in the immigration arena, and even if that regulation happens to regulate
marriage, the usual prohibition against congressional involvement in family law does
not apply. At the same time, family law . . . is one area that is clearly beyond any of
Congress’s enumerated powers . . . .”).
41
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4 (giving Congress the power to set uniform
naturalization rules).
42
Rachel Blitzer, Comment, The Kiss of Death for “Living in Marital Union”:
Strict Judicial Scrutiny of Department of Homeland Security Marital Fraud
Procedures, 2004 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 495, 496.
43
Abrams, supra note 13, at 1640 (asserting that the plenary power doctrine
gives Congress almost complete power to regulate immigration as it sees fit, even if it
would constitute an abridgement of rights in a nonimmigration context); Marcel De
Armas, Comment, For Richer or Poorer or Any Other Reason: Adjudicating Immigration
Marriage Fraud Cases Within the Scope of the Constitution, 15 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC.
POL’Y & L. 743, 747 (2007) (citing Mathews v. Diaz, 426 U.S. 67, 80 (1976)).
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citizens.44 Courts have declined to apply strict scrutiny to review
DHS regulations, instead favoring a semblance of rational basis
review, regardless of the degree to which these regulations
infringe on the right to marry.45
However, this deference is arguably misplaced, and the
Supreme Court should not be deterred by Congress’s plenary
power when adjudicating a matter as fundamental as the right to
marry.46 Furthermore, the federal government’s treatment of
potential immigrants is becoming increasingly difficult to accept
in light of the inevitable effects on Americans whose alien
spouses’ rights are abridged. Admittedly Congress has a
legitimate concern and a special interest in regulating familybased immigration due to the aforementioned benefits immediate
relative status provides. But considering that the actual
petitioner in most cases is the American citizen spouse,47 it is
worthwhile to note the discrepancies in treatment. One is often
left to wonder whether citizens sacrifice their own constitutional
guarantees in the effort to gain the same for their alien spouses,
and whether this may be considered an even exchange.48
B.

Legislative and Judicial Interplay

Recognizing that government intrusion in the marriage
relationship is socially unwelcome and historically disfavored,49 a
quick study of the manner in which courts have interpreted and
applied congressional legislation evidences the extent of judicial
deference in matters concerning immigration regulation. A
review of seminal decisions in this area illustrates the distance
between the exercise of immigration law in the marital sphere
and classic family law jurisprudence.50 Still, as the subsequent
44

Abrams, supra note 13, at 1641-42.
For a more in-depth discussion of the standards of review applied in
naturalization cases, see Part III.C of Blitzer, supra note 42, at 511-16. See generally
Jesse I. Santana, The Proverbial Catch-22: The Unconstitutionality of Section Five of
the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of 1986, 25 CAL. W. L. REV 1 (1988).
46
Blitzer, supra note 42, at 510-11 (arguing for a standard of strict scrutiny
in challenges to DHS regulations of marriage).
47
In some instances, such as with the Battered Spouse Waiver, the alien spouse
may petition for herself. 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(c)(4)(C) (2006); 8 C.F.R. § 216.5(a)(iii) (2010).
48
See David Moyce, Comment, Petitioning on Behalf of an Alien Spouse: Due
Process Under the Immigration Laws, 74 CALIF. L. REV. 1747, 1761 (1986) (arguing that
even a constitutional challenge from a U.S. citizen is an “uphill battle because the
Court has virtually abdicated its role of judicial review in immigration cases”).
49
See generally Kris Franklin, Note, A Family Like Any Other Family:
Alternative Methods of Defining Family Law, 18 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 1027
(1991); Moyce, supra note 48, at 1776.
50
See infra Parts II.B.1-3.
45
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sections indicate, an important role for the judiciary exists to
guide the interactions between immigration and family law and
to effect substantive and procedural change.
1. A Primer: The War Brides Act of 1945 and Lutwak v.
United States
Laying the foundation for future evaluative tests and
the IMFA generally, the Supreme Court tackled the issue of
“good faith” marriages in the 1953 case of Lutwak v. United
States.51 Lutwak concerned the now-defunct War Brides Act of
1945, which provided for expedited entry for alien spouses of
American war veterans.52 In the case, three World War II
veterans returned home to the United States after making a
detour through Paris to marry.53 Their French spouses were
legally admitted into the country as beneficiaries of the War
Brides Act.54 In each instance, there was evidence that the
couples either never lived together as husband and wife, or
separated within a few months.55 The Court also noted that one
of the marriages “was never consummated and was never
intended to be.”56 The petitioners contended that their
intentions for getting married were irrelevant and that the
performance of the marriage ceremonies was in and of itself
sufficient proof of the validity of the marriages.57 The Supreme
Court declined to follow this logic: “The common understanding
of a marriage, which Congress must have had in mind when it
made provision for ‘alien spouses’ in the War Brides Act, is that
the two parties have undertaken to establish a life together
and assume certain duties and obligations. Such was not the
case here . . . .”58 While this issue was not part of the direct
holding of the case on appeal, the Court’s comments provided
the framework for future determinations of a valid marriage.59

51

Lutwak v. United States, 344 U.S. 604 (1953).
War Brides Act, ch. 591, 59 Stat. 659 (1945) (expired Dec. 28, 1948).
53
Lutwak, 344 U.S. at 608-09.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id. at 609.
57
Id. at 610. (There was no dispute at trial as to whether the couples had
conducted formal marriage ceremonies.)
58
Id. at 611.
59
See De Armas, supra note 43, at 749-50.
52
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2. Pre-IMFA Substantive and Procedural Guidelines
Historically, one standard for detecting and evaluating
marriage fraud was “viability,” whereby a couple could be
denied immigration benefits if they separated, or if the
Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), now the
USCIS,60 otherwise discovered that the “marriage was not
viable and subsisting at the time the benefit was sought.”61 The
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals questioned the value of the
viability requirement as a guideline in detecting sham
marriages, and instead refocused the adjudicator’s evaluation
of the union on the parties’ intentions at the time they
married.62 A seminal case in that line of decisions, Bark v. INS,
interpreted “intent” as the intent to “establish a life together.”63
The court elaborated, “Conduct of the parties after marriage is
relevant only to the extent that it bears upon their subjective
state of mind at the time they were married.”64 The IMFA
subsequently amended the inquiry into sham marriages,
though some suggest that the two tests are not one in the
same—a couple could fail the Bark test but pass the IMFA.65
Nevertheless, the Amendments did not obsolete the Bark
standard entirely; the IMFA solicits evidence that corresponds
to both authorities.66
Very soon after Bark, a Second Circuit Court of Appeals
case, Stokes v. INS,67 also established certain guidelines for
60

The USCIS officially assumed responsibility for immigration service
functions of the federal government on March 1, 2003, as a result of the Homeland
Security Act of 2002. Pub. L. No. 107-296, § 451, 116 Stat. 2135, 2195. The Act
dismantled the INS into three components, which were subsumed by the DHS. Our
History, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/
menuitem.eb1d4c2a3e5b9ac89243c6a7543f6d1a/?vgnextoid=e00c0b89284a3210VgnVC
M100000b92ca60aRCRD&vgnextchannel=e00c0b89284a3210VgnVCM100000b92ca60a
RCRD (last visited Dec. 29, 2010); see also David A. Martin, Immigration Policy and
the Homeland Security Act Reorganization: An Early Agenda for Practical
Improvements, 80 INTERPRETER RELEASES 601, 601 (Apr. 28, 2003).
61
FRAGOMEN, JR. ET AL., supra note 17, § 3:21.
62
Bark v. INS, 511 F.2d 1200, 1202 (9th Cir. 1975) (citing Lutwak, 344 U.S.
604); Whetstone v. INS, 561 F.2d 1303, 1306 (9th Cir. 1977) (no requirement of duration).
63
Bark, 511 F.2d at 1201 (“Petitioner’s marriage was a sham if the bride and
groom did not intend to establish a life together at the time they were married.”); see
also FRAGOMEN, JR. ET AL., supra note 17, § 3:20; Abrams, supra note 13, at 1682.
64
Bark, 511 F.2d at 1202.
65
Abrams, supra note 13, at 1685 (“Notice that [the Bark] standard is
different from the IMFA standard: a couple could fail the Bark test (because the
spouses did not ‘intend to establish a life together’) yet pass the IMFA test because
they did not enter into marriage ‘for the purpose of evading the immigration laws.’”).
66
Petitioners are encouraged to provide documentation showing proof of
cohabitation, reproduction, and commingling of finances. Abrams, supra note 13, at 1683.
67
Stokes v. INS, No. 74 Civ. 1022 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 1, 1976) (consent judgment).
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adjudicating suspect I-130 spousal petitions.68 While the former
case was significant for its substantive implications,69 the latter
was hailed as a procedural milestone in this area of law.70 As a
result of this New York case, the “Stokes Unit” was formed as a
division of the USCIS, unique to the New York District Office.71
Petitioners are referred to the Stokes Unit if they fail their first
fraud interview or if they are currently in removal
proceedings.72 The Unit’s enumerated procedures include a
written notice detailing the petitioner’s rights, a list of rights
mailed as a separate attachment to the appointment letter, and
a list of requested documents to be submitted at the interview
appointment.73 Officers also record the interviews as an added
procedural safeguard74 and are not to inquire into the sexual
practices or contraceptive use of the petitioning couple.75 Unlike
other parts of the country where authorities may stage dawn

68

See Note, The Constitutionality of the INS Sham Marriage Investigation
Policy, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1238, 1252 (1986) [hereinafter Sham Marriage]; Moyce, supra
note 48, at 1757 n.74.
69
See Abrams, supra note 13, at 1685.
70
The USCIS’s practice manual for adjudicators contains a separate section on
“Stokes” interviews, deeming them “of interest” to adjudicators throughout the Service as an
exemplar of an effective fraud interview program. 15.5 New York City District Office
(“Stokes”) Interviews, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/
ilink/docView/AFM/HTML/AFM/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-2449/0-0-0-2716.html (last visited Sept. 30,
2011); see also Jan H. Brown, Family Immigration Issues—Love Conquers All?, 1514
PRACTISING LAW INST.: CORP. LAW & PRAC. COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES 247, 256 (2005) (“In
the second circuit, if an interviewer is not satisfied with the bona fides of a marriage, the
case is referred for a secondary interview . . . . In the other circuits, the parties are not
protected by [the Stokes] decision and interviewers can separate the parties at the
initial (and often only) interview, an understanding in the quest for bona fides of the
marriage.”).
71
15.5 New York City District Office (“Stokes”) Interviews, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/AFM/HTML/AFM/0-0-0-1/0-0-02449.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2011); Moyce, supra note 48, at 1757 n.74; see also
Brown, supra note 70, at 256.
72
See Brown, supra note 70, at 256; 15.5 New York City District Office (“Stokes”)
Interviews, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/AFM/
HTML/AFM/0-0-0-1/0-0-0-2449.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2011) (“The unit receives the
bulk of its work from the regular adjustment of status unit (75%) with the remainder of
cases referred from the Litigation Unit. . . . Without such a remand the Stokes Unit
adjudicates only the I-130 petition.”).
73
15.5 New York City District Office (“Stokes”) Interviews, U.S. CITIZENSHIP &
IMMIGR. SERVICES, available at http://www.uscis.gov/ilink/docView/AFM/HTML/AFM/0-0-01/0-0-0-2449.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2011).
74
See Nina Bernstein, Wed in 1993, but Stuck in Immigration Limbo, N.Y.
TIMES, June 13, 2010, at A16.
75
Bernstein, supra note 1, at MB1; see also Moyce, supra note 48, at 1757
n.74 (discussing procedural standards resulting from the Stokes consent judgment,
including the proscription against sexually intimate questions, and the prohibition
against petition denial solely based on a petitioner’s exercise of the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination).
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“bed checks,” New York forbids the practice.76 This difference is
significant; as one Denver-based immigration attorney recounted
to the New York Times, “Someone shows up at your house with a
badge and a gun, unannounced . . . . ‘Hi, we’re here from
immigration. Do you mind if we come in to look and see if two
towels are wet?’”77 Comparatively, Stokes seemed a landmark win
for marital privacy in immigrant homes. But the case’s effect has
been more theoretical than practical. More than three decades
since the decisions in Bark and Stokes, and over two decades since
the promulgation of the IMFA, the federal government still
refuses to respect the guidelines that do exist and is reluctant to
acknowledge the need for modern normative standards.78
3. Balancing Theory Against Practice
Regardless of Bark’s interpretation of “intent,” Lutwak’s
focus on the petitioning couple at the time they were married,
and
Stokes’s
concerns
with
procedural
safeguards,
administrators’ decisions are largely discretionary and rarely
questioned.79 Great importance is still given to behavior that
takes place after the marriage ceremony.80 Moreover, officers
have been known to violate protocol in a variety of ways,
including asking about interviewees’ sexual lives and
contraceptive use.81 Thus, even though practice manuals
directed at adjudicators exist,82 it is still unclear exactly what
76

Bernstein, supra note 1, at MB1.
Id. (quoting Laura Lichter, Esq.).
78
See infra Part III.
79
See Moyce, supra note 48, at 1752 (claiming that adjudicators “operate
with a relatively free hand”).
80
One justification is that these behaviors shed light on the intentions of the
couple at the time they were married. Abrams, supra note 13, at 1685.
77

Cohabitation, commingling of finances, and reproduction are the three primary
ways of proving the bona fides of a marriage. All three of these factors, though,
involve events that happen after the marriage takes place, and courts use these
events to try to determine what the couple intended at the moment of
marrying.
Id. (citation omitted).
81
See Bernstein, supra note 7; Moyce, supra note 48, at 1757 n.74 (“There is
evidence, however, that those standards that have been established are frequently
ignored by the officials who actually pass upon the petitions.”); see also Sham
Marriage, supra note 68, at 1243.
82
See generally Adjudicator’s Field Manual—Redacted Public Version, U.S.
CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/portal/site/uscis/menuitem.f6da
51a2342135be7e9d7a10e0dc91a0/?vgnextoid=fa7e539dc4bed010VgnVCM1000000ecd19
0aRCRD&vgnextchannel=fa7e539dc4bed010VgnVCM1000000ecd190aRCRD&CH=afm
(last visited Sept. 30, 2011).

722

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 77:2

the DHS and USCIS are looking for—beyond documentation—
in order to make their determinations. Couples could be
happily married for years and still fail to present a satisfactory
marriage for the purposes of the USCIS.83
Consider the plight of one couple chronicled in the New
York Times, the citizen spouse joking, “our marriage certificate is
so old, it’s yellow.”84 If the consequences were not so grave, their
story would be comical. The New York couple has been married
seventeen years; yet after three petitions and five marriage
interviews, federal immigration officials were still not satisfied
that the couple’s union was not a ruse to obtain status.85 The
couple even presented authorities with documentation normally
indicative of the bona fides of a marriage,86 such as a joint
apartment lease, tax filings, bank statements, and photo albums.87
According to the article, conflicting answers they gave four years
prior—to questions such as whether the husband had taken his
wife out to eat on her last birthday—overshadowed the probative
value of their documentation.88 Their last denial letter also
attacked the insufficiency of funds in their joint bank account.89
Interestingly, for all the procedural benefits the Stokes Unit
purportedly offers over other states, the couple lamented that
they would have preferred a home visit.90 Any attempt to reconcile
their experience with present attitudes toward the nebulous
nature of relationships today must remember to take into account
the qualities an adjudicator will be looking for—characteristics of
a prototypical marriage.91 As the next part argues, Congress is
83

Bernstein, supra note 74, at A16.
Id.
Id. (quoting the petitioner, “If I was, in fact, fraudulently married to my
husband for the purposes of obtaining a green card for him, would I have continued to
file over and over and over again?”).
86
See supra text accompanying note 27.
87
Bernstein, supra note 74, at A16.
88
Id.
89
In its last denial letter, the immigration agency dismissed documents
normally indicative of the bona fides of marriage, noting, for example,
84
85

that the joint account they opened in 1997 showed low balances of $8.11 and
$62.15 in two 2008 statements. The letter concluded that their documents did
not outweigh the discrepancies in answers the couple gave at their 2006
interview—like her statement that their rent was $677.17, while he said,
“About $700.”
Id.
90

Id. (“The couple say they wish that federal officials would just go up to
their fifth-floor apartment to see how they manage on her Supplemental Security
Income disability payments and his meager wages.”).
91
See infra Part III.
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effectively holding cross-cultural couples to an antiquated
standard that even most Americans today would not meet.
III.

DEFINING “FAMILY” IN UNITED STATES IMMIGRATION
POLICY: AN AMERICAN ANACHRONISM

While congressional attitude toward the convention of
marriage is out of line with prevailing cultural norms, it is not
an anomaly—the notion of “family” preferred and recognized by
American law is rooted in centuries-old history and values.92
The passage of time has not much altered this concept, an
embodiment of the traditional patriarchal household.93 This
stagnation in American jurisprudence has effectively
“enshrined the mythological nuclear family as its ideal model.”94
As a result, current laws favor an ideal that amounts to a
fallacy in the majority of American households.95 The law’s
insistence on adhering to a family archetype based on
antiquated norms severely prejudices and disadvantages all
who fall outside of the traditional structure.96
A.

Evolving Society, Antiquated Definitions

Nowhere is the impracticality of this preference for a
conventional standard more obvious than in the immigration
context; requiring international couples to conform to the mold
of an old-fashioned American marriage is illogical since, by
definition, international marriages “blend two cultures, at least
one of which is not American.”97 Moreover, the definition of
what constitutes a traditional American marriage has changed
and expanded.98 Due to rising rates of divorce, single parenting,
step-parenting, polyparenting, and unmarried cohabitation,
only a minority of families today fit the nuclear model.99
92

Jennifer R. Johnson, Preferred by Law: The Disappearance of the Traditional
Family and Law’s Refusal to Let It Go, 25 WOMEN’S RTS. L. REP. 125, 125 (2004).
93
Id. at 126.
94
Franklin, supra note 49, at 1052.
95
See generally Johnson, supra note 92.
96
Id. at 125.
97
Blitzer, supra note 42, at 498.
98
See Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the Functional
Approach to the Legal Definition of Family, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1640, 1640 (1991)
[hereinafter Family Resemblance].
99
See Johnson, supra note 92, at 128-29 (“[A]s of 2000, [nuclear] families
comprised just 23.5% of the American population. This statistic means that almost four
out of five American families do not fit this model.”); see also Family Resemblance,
supra note 98, at 1640.
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Further, evidence indicates that alternative familial models are
on the rise while the conventional archetype continues to
decline.100 For example, some “traditionally married couples”
choose not to combine their “legal and financial affairs.”101
Others, especially elderly couples, may not consummate the
marriage.102 Thus, it makes little sense to hold anyone to this
“mythological nuclear model” of two heterosexual adult
partners who are married with two children, much less a
multicultural family.103
Interestingly, it has been suggested that immigration
policy that attempts to conform marriages to the conventional
cast may have it backward since immigrants often espouse the
very ideals considered to be traditional, and do so better than
American-born citizens.104 Additionally, if anything, “marriages
of convenience” are an accepted and established institution in
American culture; it is certainly not novel to hear of someone
marrying for riches, celebrity, or social status, so why should
marrying for immigration status be regarded so harshly? And
yet the validity of American marriages is not questioned, while
multicultural couples are forced to rebut the presumption of a
fraudulent marriage.
B.

Practical Consequences of Promoting a Stereotypical
Marriage

The judiciary has recognized that it is not appropriate
for courts to require alien spouses “to have more conventional
or more successful marriages than citizens.”105 Courts have also
acknowledged that regulating a couple’s behavior and conduct
raises constitutional issues.106 Yet, practically speaking,
100

Johnson, supra note 92, at 129
Family Resemblance, supra note 98, at 1654.
102
See id.
103
See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 92, at 128 (“Today’s families, whether oncenuclear Families now divorced or families that never took the traditional form, do not
in fact follow the model of two Married Parents with dependent children.”).
104
David Brooks, Immigrants to Be Proud Of, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30, 2006, at
A25; Chacón, supra note 39, at 374 (“Ironically, the families of noncitzens may better
exemplify traditional ‘family values’ than nonimmigrant families. Children in
immigrant households are more likely to live in two-parent households than children in
entirely native families.”).
105
Bark v. INS, 511 F.2d 1200, 1201-02 (1975); Blitzer, supra note 42, at 499.
106
Bark, 511 F.2d at 1201 (“Any attempt to regulate their life styles, such as
prescribing the amount of time they must spend together, or designating the manner in
which either partner elects to spend his or her time, in the guise of specifying the
requirements of a bona fide marriage would raise serious constitutional questions.”);
see also Blitzer, supra note 42, at 499.
101
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citizenship hopefuls are being held to a higher standard than
their citizen counterparts. A USCIS agency worksheet recently
leaked on the Internet lists “red flags” for officers to check off
when evaluating I-130 petitions for marriage fraud.107 Suspect
characteristics include “unusual” or large discrepancies in age, an
“unusual” number of children or large gaps in age between
children, “unusual” cultural differences, and “unusual”
associations between family members.108 As an immigration
lawyer commented to the New York Times, “[T]he boxes on the
worksheet ‘pretty much invite racial profiling and other
stereotypes.’”109 The worksheet fails to define what would
constitute, for example, an “unusual” cultural difference; at least,
not beyond soliciting officers to make personal value judgments
based on which cultural phenomena qualify as abnormal. Also
unclear is against whose cultural benchmark petitioners are
measured—almost 25 percent of married couples accounted for in
the 2000 census list an age difference of six or more years.110
When does a May-December pairing cease to be a
romantic notion and begin to arouse suspicion? The criteria
listed on the “Fraud Referral Worksheet” may not act as a direct
mandate for a determination of fraud; however, they do provide
insight into the highly discretionary, arbitrary, and culturally
insensitive message the USCIS communicates to its officers. An
unfortunate consequence of the U.S. government’s approach to
evaluating the bona fides of a marriage is that petitioners may
further arouse the suspicions of officers by attempting to conform
to the ideal of a picture-perfect couple.111 Clearly officers will be
sensitive to any indications of unnatural behavior in an interview
setting.112 One author tells the story of an alien spouse who failed
to state that he was living separately from his wife—presumably
because he believed this fact would provoke suspicion.113 DHS
107

Fraud Referral Worksheet, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES (Sept. 30,
2004), available at http://graphics8.nytimes.com/packages/pdf/nyregion/USCIS_Fraud_
Referral_Sheet.pdf.
108
Id.
109
Bernstein, supra note 1, at MB1 (quoting Daniel Lundy, Esq.).
110
Table FG3: Married Couple Family Groups, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (Mar.
2001), http://www.census.gov/population/socdemo/hh-fam/cps2001/tabFG3.pdf.
111
Abrams, supra note 13, at 1691 (“One inevitable result of an immigration
policy that uses marriage as a category for admission is that immigrants are required
to self-police their marriages, crafting the kind of marriages that they think will pass
muster in immigration service interviews even where the marriages they had
anticipated having would have looked much different.”).
112
Fraud Referral Worksheet, supra note 107, at 1.
113
Abrams, supra note 13, at 1687-92 (recounting anecdotal evidence from
several couples falsely accused of fraud).
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subsequently learned the truth, deemed it a material
misrepresentation, and denied his petition.114
A section of the Fraud Referral worksheet applicable to
all evaluations, entitled “General Behavioral Fraud Indicators
Guide,” identifies specific potentially suspect behaviors such as
“extreme nervousness” and devotes three of the ten checklist
boxes to attorney presence in the interview.115 The three boxes
correspond to any answers that may be prompted or
interrupted by an attorney, or any attempts by the attorney to
distract or mislead.116 Two issues immediately become apparent.
First, it would appear unnatural not to be considerably nervous
in a setting where the outcome could mean the deportation of
your spouse. Second, devoting so much attention to attorneys’
behavior undermines the principle of attorney presence as a
procedural safeguard.117 Furthermore, distrust of attorneys is
unwarranted since it has been suggested that attorneys
actually aid in the policing of sham marriages by acting as a
preliminary barrier to vet clients for fraud.118 In any event, the
question persists: what evidence suffices to show a valid
marriage? Based on sample USCIS administrative officers’
questions, it would seem that knowledge of the intricacies of
one’s microwave oven is indicative of a bona fide marriage.119
But if this were sufficient, then why has the USCIS taken to
social networking sites as a measure to investigate fraud?
IV.

UPGRADING INVESTIGATIVE METHODS, DOWNGRADING
CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTIONS

Facebook,120 Twitter,121 and Flickr122 are social networking
and media-sharing sites, and they all fall, in that order, within
114

Id.
Fraud Referral Worksheet, supra note 107.
116
Id.
117
See Harvey Kaplan, Stokes Revisited, 9 IMMIGR. J., July-Sept. 1986, at 4.
118
Abrams, supra note 13, at 1692.
119
Sample questions provided by lawyers present at Stokes interviews
include: “Is your microwave stationary or does it have a revolving plate? If you are
standing at and facing your kitchen sink, where is the microwave oven?” Bernstein,
supra note 7.
120
According to the company’s factsheet, “Facebook is a social utility that
helps people communicate more efficiently with their friends, family and
coworkers. . . . Anyone can sign up for Facebook and interact with the people they know
in a trusted environment.” Factsheet, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/press/
info.php?factsheet (last visited Nov. 3, 2011).
121
Twitter is a “real-time information network” that is primarily a way of
sharing 140 character messages called “Tweets.” About, TWITTER, http://twitter.com/
about (last visited Nov. 3, 2011).
115
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the top twenty-six most visited websites in the United States.123
Facebook, the second most visited site, has more than 800
million active users, and the average user has 130 friends and
is connected to 80 community pages, groups, and events.124 The
site’s founder, Mark Zuckerberg, envisions a utopian world
fueled by openness and connectedness—simply put, a world of
seamless sharing.125 This strong preference for visibility in
online communications translates to a privacy model that
defaults to maximum exposure, placing the onus on users to
scale back access.126 Unfortunately for citizenship petitioners,
just as social media is a useful and attractive tool for
individuals looking to network or connect with distant friends,
family, or even fans, it is also a beacon for anyone looking for a
centralized database of personal information, including the
U.S. government. As Internet services that encourage people to
store an abundance of personal information—including
photographs, e-mails, and contact lists—rise in popularity, so
does the temptation for law enforcement to tap into the trove of
personally identifiable information.127
A.

Placing Social Media on USCIS’ Radar and Agents’
Agendas

The federal government has taken active measures to
ensure that its agents are aware of the popularity of social
122

Flickr is an online photo management and sharing application that aims
“to get photos and video into and out of the system in as many ways as [possible],”
including on the Flickr website, RSS feeds, e-mail, posts to outside blogs, etc. About
Flickr, FLICKR, http://www.flickr.com/about/ (last visited Nov. 3, 2011).
123
Top Sites in United States, ALEXA, http://www.alexa.com/topsites/countries;0/
US (last visited Oct. 6, 2011) (Facebook #2, Twitter #7, Flickr #26). Globally, Facebook is #2,
Twitter #9, and Flickr #35. Top 500 Global Sites, ALEXA, http://www.alexa.com/
topsites/global;0 (last visited Oct. 6, 2011).
124
Statistics, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/press/info.php?statistics (last
visited Oct. 26, 2011). “Active” users are defined as those who have returned to the site in
the previous thirty days. Factsheet, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/press/
info.php?factsheet (last visited Oct. 26, 2011).
125
Michiko Kakutani, Company on the Verge of a Social Breakthrough, N.Y.
TIMES, June 8, 2010, at C1 (describing Zuckerberg as “a chief executive with an almost
missionary zeal when it comes to getting people to share information” in a review of
David Kirkpatrick’s book, The Facebook Effect).
126
Id.
127
Apparently law enforcement officials are succumbing to the temptation—
Google counted more than 4200 requests for consumer data by United States law
enforcement agencies in the first half of 2010 alone. Miguel Helft & Claire Cain Miller,
Web Outruns Privacy Law, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 10, 2011, at A1. Verizon made a similar
calculation before Congress in 2007, reporting that it received an average of 90,000
such requests each year. Id. In 2009, Facebook reported that ten to twenty subpoenas
and other orders were arriving daily. Id.
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networking sites, as well as the degree to which these sites are
willing to cooperate with law enforcement.128 In a PowerPoint
presentation by the Computer Crime and Intellectual Property
Section (CCIPS) of the Department of Justice (DOJ) on the legal
and practical implications of obtaining evidence from social
networking sites, agents are shown the benefits of going
undercover on these sites—namely, that they will be able to gain
access to nonpublic information, communicate with suspects and
targets, and map social relationships.129 In fact, law enforcement
officials have already had success in criminal investigations with
the help of Twitter130 and Facebook,131 among others. Naturally,
the government has a legitimate and vested interest in tracking
crime suspects; instructing agents to infiltrate the social
networks of citizenship petitioners, however, presumes guilt and
fails to confine the inquiry to ongoing criminal investigations.132
This gray area opens the back door to using social networking
sites to troll profiles for potential targets.
A May 2008 memorandum from the Office of Fraud
Detection and National Security (FDNS) entitled “Social
Networking Sites and Their Importance to FDNS” elaborates
on the utility of social media, specifically in immigration
marriage fraud investigations.133
Narcissistic tendencies in many people fuels [sic] a need to have a
large group of “friends” link to their pages and many of these people
accept cyber-friends that they don’t even know. This provides an
excellent vantage point for FDNS to observe the daily life of
beneficiaries and petitioners . . . [and] gives FDNS an opportunity to
reveal fraud by browsing these sites to see if petitioners and
beneficiaries are in a valid relationship or are attempting to deceive
[US]CIS about their relationship.134

128

JOHN LYNCH & JENNY ELLICKSON, OBTAINING AND USING EVIDENCE FROM
SOCIAL NETWORKING SITES: FACEBOOK, MYSPACE, LINKEDIN, AND MORE, available at
http://www.eff.org/files/filenode/social_network/20100303__crim_socialnetworking.pdf.
129
Id.
130
See, e.g., Moynihan, supra note 11, at A19 (man spreading information about
police movements on Twitter arrested on charges of hindering apprehension or prosecution,
criminal use of a communication facility, and possession of instruments of a crime).
131
See, e.g., Johnson, supra note 11. A bank fraud fugitive was captured in
Cancún after U.S. authorities tracked him down through Facebook. Id. While his
profile was set to private, his list of friends was not. Id. The Secret Service discovered
one of his “friends” had an affiliation with the Justice Department and used this
connection to access information about the fugitive’s whereabouts. Id.; see also Masis,
supra note 11.
132
See supra text accompanying note 127.
133
See Memorandum, supra note 10.
134
Id.

2012]

IMMIGRATION MARRIAGE FRAUD INVESTIGATION

729

It is clear from this memorandum that the USCIS, in
recognition of the false sense of security fostered on social
networking sites, is recommending its agents befriend
citizenship petitioners in order to view information to which
they would not otherwise have access. As the Electronic
Frontier Foundation (EFF) highlighted, the memo does not
specify any threshold of suspicion that must be triggered before
the agency deploys these covert tactics.135 The lack of guidance
or boundaries effectively gives DHS agents the message that
any petitioner is an acceptable target for monitoring in this
fashion. Additionally, the memo fails to address whether DHS
agents are obligated to reveal their government affiliation, an
omission that seems to openly encourage deception. If a user
unknowingly accepts a friend request from an agent using an
alias, the user may not only expose himself to DHS monitoring,
but also all of his contacts.136 While petitioners and beneficiaries
may have the wisdom to reject or ignore friend requests from
perfect strangers, they cannot prevent their contacts from
falling into a trap.
And yet, the underhandedness of DHS operations is not
the most frightening part of the released FDNS memo; it
dangerously assumes that individuals speak truthfully when
posting on social networking sites.137 The federal memorandum
parallels patrolling social networking sites to making an
“unannounced cyber ‘site-visit’ on a [sic] petitioners and
beneficiaries.”138 Again, this analogy incorrectly assumes that
people behave in the same way, or put forth the same
impressions, online as they do in everyday life. The federal
government, as a result of this faulty logic, is not accounting for
any discrepancies that may exist between the two when
instructing its agents to browse social networking sites to
investigate
petitioners’
and
beneficiaries’
purported
relationships.139 Consequently, as EFF warns, “this memo
suggests there’s nothing to prevent an exaggerated, harmless or
even out-of-date off-hand comment in a status update from
quickly becoming the subject of a full citizenship investigation.”140

135
136
137
138
139
140

Lynch, supra note 12.
See supra text accompanying note 131.
Memorandum, supra note 10.
Id.
See id.
Lynch, supra note 12.
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Studies Reveal Availability and Accessibility of Private
Information on Social Media

Two recent studies conducted by a security software
company explore the ease with which individuals in cyberspace
expose their own personal information, as well as that of their
contacts.141 The studies illustrate the risks posed to citizenship
petitioners and beneficiaries in the event federal agents—
especially those using an alias—target their marriage. In the
first experiment, conducted in 2007, researchers created a
profile on Facebook for “Freddi Staur,” an anagram of “ID
Fraudster,” represented by a small green plastic frog.142 In the
next phase, two hundred random friend requests were sent to
Facebook users across the globe.143 The aim was to see how
many people would accept Freddi into their network, thus
revealing personal information about themselves and exposing
everyone in their networks to infiltration.144 The results were
less than comforting: 41 percent of people approached
responded to the friend request.145 Of these responders, the
majority leaked personal data, including photos of family and
friends as well as information about their likes, dislikes,
hobbies, and employers.146
Apparently, the situation has not improved with time;
in fact, a follow-up study two years later suggests that
Facebook users have become even more cavalier with their
personal information.147 The 2009 study featured two fabricated
profiles: “Daisy Felettin” (an anagram of “false identity”), a
twenty-one-year-old female represented by a picture of a toy
rubber duck, and, “Dinette Stonily” (an anagram of “stolen
identity”), a fifty-six-year-old female with a profile picture of

141

Facebook: The Privacy Challenge, SOPHOS, http://www.sophos.com/en-us/
security-news-trends/security-trends/facebook.aspx (last visited Oct. 8, 2011).
142
Sophos Facebook ID Probe Shows 41% of Users Happy to Reveal All to
Potential Identity Thieves, SOPHOS (Aug. 14, 2007), http://www.sophos.com/en-us/pressoffice/press-releases/2007/08/facebook.aspx.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id. Specifically, 87 of the 200 users contacted responded to Freddi. Id. Of
those respondents, 72% revealed one or more e-mail addresses, 84% detailed their full
date of birth, 87% provided details about their education and work experience, 78%
listed their current address or location, 23% listed their current phone number, and
26% provided their instant messaging screenname. Id.
147
See Facebook Users at Risk of “Rubber Duck” Identity Attack, SOPHOS (Dec. 7,
2009), http://www.sophos.com/en-us/press-office/press-releases/2009/12/facebook.aspx.

2012]

IMMIGRATION MARRIAGE FRAUD INVESTIGATION

731

two cats lying on a rug.148 Each profile submitted one hundred
friend requests to randomly chosen users in their age group.149
Within a mere two weeks, Daisy and Dinette had managed to
amass ninety-five friends, 46 percent of those requested.150
Commentators have developed many theories in the
search to understand why individuals would carelessly turn
over personal information; some speculate that users of social
networking sites still do not appreciate the extent to which
third parties can access their information,151 while others credit
the sense of anonymity users feel amidst the hundreds of
millions of social network profiles.152 Whichever theory is correct
is beside the point; the frightening reality is that individuals
are unknowingly surrendering their private information at
alarming rates, which poses potentially grave problems for
citizenship candidates. One can imagine information gathered
from user-generated content is ripe for misunderstandings and
there are no guarantees that citizenship petitioners and
beneficiaries will be given the opportunity to explain
themselves, especially if they are unaware of the “suspicious”
content in the first place. It is now evident that the government
will not give petitioners the benefit of the doubt, much less a
warning before invading their privacy.
V.

GOVERNMENTAL INTRUSIONS INTO THE MARITAL
RELATIONSHIP: COMPROMISING MARITAL PRIVACY IN THE
INTEREST OF SPOUSAL PETITION DETERMINATIONS

As previously noted, DHS investigations of American
citizen petitioners’ marriages raise a number of privacy issues,
which are further compounded by agents’ surreptitious
presence on social networking sites. The following sections
explore the major privacy issues facing citizenship petitioners
and beneficiaries, as well as evaluate the struggle between the
148

Id.
Id.
150
Id. Eight users befriended Dinette of their own initiative. Id. Further
statistics for Daisy and Dinette include, respectively: 89% and 57% of respondents gave
their full date of birth; 100% and 88% provided their e-mail address; 74% and 22%
listed their college or workplace; 46% and 31% divulged family and friend data. Id.
151
Samantha L. Millier, Note, The Facebook Frontier: Responding to the
Changing Face of Privacy on the Internet, 97 KY. L.J. 541, 542 (2009).
152
Danielle Keats Citron, Fulfilling Government 2.0’s Promise with Robust
Privacy Protections, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 822, 835 (2010) (quoting social media
researcher danah boyd, “social network participants ‘live by security through obscurity,
where they assume that as long as no one cares about them, no one will come knocking’”
(faithful to researcher’s preferred orthography for her name written in lowercase)).
149
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protection of governmental interests and the importance of
marital privacy. In particular, the role that the Internet and
social networking sites play in exacerbating the already
existing tensions will be examined.
A.

The Elusive “Zone of Privacy” in Cross-Cultural
Marriages

The marital bond has long occupied an elevated status
in constitutional due process jurisprudence.153 As established
through Supreme Court precedent, it is “a relationship lying
within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental
constitutional guarantees.”154 Nonetheless, federal immigration
procedures threaten the rights of citizen spouses in myriad
ways. Consequently, when an American marries a noncitizen,
their union is relegated to the outermost levels of that
protected “zone.” One such example is the act of placing couples
under surveillance and subjecting them to a fraud interview
where they are asked questions that reflect antiquated notions
of what an American marriage should look like.155 In this
manner, the DHS exerts undue pressure on couples to conform
to outdated norms, thereby excepting other cultural values and
marital customs.156 The marital bond is then burdened by
attempts to force conformity with USCIS conceptions of a valid
marriage, including the amount of time spent together, level of
intimacy, and decision to procreate.157
As one commentator highlighted, while legislation since
1986 has changed the procedure for applying for permanent
resident status, the IMFA did not alter the standard for
defining or identifying a bona fide marriage.158 More specifically,
concrete definitions or standards were not communicated
sufficiently in order to avoid the confusion that has resulted
since its passage. The broad discretion afforded USCIS officers
153

See generally Moyce, supra note 48, at 1754-57.
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965); see also Moyce, supra
note 48, at 1776 (discussing the establishment of a protected interest in marital privacy
through Supreme Court precedent); Sham Marriage, supra note 68, at 1244 (“Because
of the intensely personal nature of the marital relationship, the Court has established
a constitutionally protected zone of marital and familial privacy that the state cannot
enter without a compelling justification.”).
155
See Sham Marriage, supra note 68, at 1246.
156
See id.
157
Id.
158
Kikuyo Matsumoto-Power, Comment, Aliens, Resident Aliens, and U.S.
Citizens in the Never-Never Land of the Immigration and Nationality Act, 15 U. HAW.
L. REV. 61, 69 (1993).
154
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combined with a lack of guidance has led to “ad hoc
determinations based on their own subjective views of a valid
marriage.”159 When such a significant part of each marital fraud
determination relies on the discretion of administrative
officers,160 and that broad discretion is compounded by a dearth
of reviewable standards, it invites arbitrary and possibly
discriminatory decisions,161 encouraging further attacks on the
rights of the international couple. Plus, whatever grounds may
exist for the maltreatment of nonresident aliens, no parallel
justification exists for subjecting American citizens, who are one
half of the equation, to possibly arbitrary infringements of their
recognized rights.162 Nevertheless, “courts almost never discuss
the issue of a U.S. citizen’s fundamental rights of marriage and
marital privacy when they justify [DHS] restrictions.”163

159

Id.
For an instructive discussion of the discretionary nature and subjective
considerations involved in the adjudication process, see 10.15 Exercise of Discretion;
Uniformity of Decisions, U.S. CITIZENSHIP & IMMIGR. SERVICES, http://www.uscis.gov/
portal/site/uscis/menuitem.f6da51a2342135be7e9d7a10e0dc91a0/?vgnextoid=fa7e539dc
4bed010VgnVCM1000000ecd190aRCRD&vgnextchannel=fa7e539dc4bed010VgnVCM1
000000ecd190aRCRD&CH=afm (last visited Sept. 30, 2011).
161
The potential for arbitrariness is further exposed in instances where the
Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) acknowledges fault in a district’s denial of an I130 petition. See generally BIA Addresses Timeliness of Appeal and Discrepancies in
Stokes Interview in Unpublished Decision, 84 No. 43 INTERPRETER RELEASES 2615,
2615 (Nov. 5, 2007) (discussing In re Chen, A79 717 355 (BIA Oct. 9, 2007)). For
instance, in the unpublished opinion, the BIA found, after listening to the interview
transcript, that a New York district director improperly denied an I-130 petition on the
grounds of discrepant answers during the Stokes interview. Id. Specifically, the BIA
noted that some of the so-called “discrepancies” were actually consistent answers and
others were relatively minor differences. Id. The BIA further found that the petitioner
proffered reasonable explanations for the answers that were divergent, many of which
only required a little cultural sensitivity and understanding. Id.
160

[T]he Board found that the interview transcript revealed that, in the case of two
of the cited discrepancies, the parties’ responses were actually consistent in
that in response to a question about their bank account balance, the petitioner
stated that it was “$1,000 something” and the beneficiary said initially that it
was “$1,000 something” and then added that it was “like $1500,” and,
concerning the petitioner’s children from his first marriage, the transcript
reflected that both parties indicated that the beneficiary and the children had
not met because they did not wish to do so. . . . Other discrepancies . . . related
to Chinese cultural differences . . . . By way of example, the Board noted that
the petitioner explained that the beneficiary did not know the name of his
father who was living in China because she referred to him only by the
traditional honorific “Father.”
Id.
162
163

See Moyce, supra note 48, at 1776.
Matsumoto-Power, supra note 158, at 76.
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A “Trilemma” for Citizen Spouses

Of course, realistically speaking, not every couple
investigated is engaged in a bona fide marriage, and those who
are embroiled in a conspiratorial attempt to defraud the United
States by way of immediate-relative preferential status have
forfeited some of their rights. But those who find DHS protocol
permissible on this basis assume too much. Their reverse logic
has been countered by constitutional rationalizations that
caution “even in the case of actual sham marriages, the [DHS]
must apply its procedures before it can determine fraud. The
[DHS] should not be permitted to bootstrap otherwise
unconstitutional investigations through the results of those
same investigations.”164
Invasive investigatory procedures effectively leave
American citizen spouses of nonresident aliens with three
constitutionally inadequate options.165 In the first scenario, the
citizen spouse is forced to submit to an intrusive DHS
investigation, which comprises his right to marital privacy.166
The second option envisions a petitioner who refuses to comply
with DHS protocol, thereby preserving his right to privacy, but
at the expense of his right to marry an individual of his
choosing167 since she168 is likely to be placed into removal
proceedings.169 The third course of action available to the
American spouse avoids the forfeiture of marital and privacy
rights, but requires him to leave the country with his bride.170 If
this were a constitutionally viable option, it would justify
practically any abridgement of rights since individuals can
almost always escape a violation of their rights by emigrating.171
Somewhat analogously, citizenship petitioners and beneficiaries
could choose not to open a Facebook account, or post a family
164

Sham Marriage, supra note 68, at 1248 (“The fact that some marriages
scrutinized by the [DHS] are fraudulent does not license the [DHS] to infringe upon the
constitutional rights of all couples seeking adjustment of status.”).
165
Id. at 1247-48.
166
Id. at 1247.
167
See, e.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1966) (“The freedom to marry
has long been recognized as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men.”).
168
Male and female pronouns are used as a reflection of current federal law,
which precludes recognition for same-sex unions, regardless of state policy on the
matter. See Defense of Marriage Act, 1 U.S.C. § 7, 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2006).
169
Sham Marriage, supra note 68, at 1247.
170
Id. at 1248.
171
Id. (“Thus, the [DHS] places legitimately married citizens and residents in
a trilemma that is prima facie unconstitutional.”).
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photo album on Flickr—though that would not prevent the
presence of personal information by way of third parties, known
or unknown. Still, the preferable solution would be to find a way
in which the government could have access to petitioners’
information without invading the bounds of privacy.
VI.

TESTING THE APPLICABILITY OF FOURTH AMENDMENT
JURISPRUDENCE TO USCIS INVESTIGATIONS ON SOCIAL
NETWORKING SITES

Throughout history, the development of emerging
technologies has posed novel questions for the Supreme Court,
requiring doctrinal and factual parallels to be made, and at
times even leading to the creation of new fields of study.172 This
technology-fueled legal evolution is particularly true of Fourth
Amendment law.173 Concerns raised earlier about governmental
invasions of privacy echo current debates on the scope of
Fourth Amendment protection on the Internet. This part
reviews the development of Fourth Amendment law from its
British roots to its current penumbral iteration. Based on the
expansion of Fourth Amendment interpretation, the following
subsection superimposes the current legal framework onto the
immigration marriage fraud investigatory process. While
nevertheless concluding that a constitutional challenge to
USCIS tactics would likely not succeed, this part seeks to
illustrate that these governmental measures, even if they do
not outright violate, at the very least offend the spirit of Fourth
Amendment protection.
A.

A History Grounded in Tangible Property

The Fourth Amendment’s roots can be traced to Great
Britain under the regime of King George II.174 Through the
issuance of a “general warrant,” the King would authorize
officers to search private homes for evidence of a crime; no level
of suspicion was needed to conduct a search.175 This unjustified
invasion by the government into citizens’ private homes is the
172

See Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach,
113 HARV. L. REV. 501, 502 (1999) (contending that a law of cyberspace does exist and
is of value to the study of law, in response to Hon. Frank H. Easterbrook’s Cyberspace
and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207).
173
See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies:
Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102 MICH. L. REV. 801, 802 (2004).
174
LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE VERSION 2.0, at 21 (2006).
175
Id.
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exact abuse the Fourth Amendment was designed to prevent.176
Therefore, it is the Fourth Amendment that provides the basis
for an individual right of security from governmental
intrusion.177 Yet, that right is not absolute, requiring courts to
continually redefine its borders because “[a]s technology
advances, legal rules designed for one state of technology begin
to take on unintended consequences. . . . [and] the old rules no
longer serve the same function. New rules may be needed to
reestablish the function of the old rules in the new
technological environment.”178
Where technology has been the impetus for testing the
limits of Fourth Amendment protection, the Supreme Court
has been forced to reinterpret the language of the Amendment,
while remaining faithful to its spirit.179 As Justice Brandeis
famously dissented in Olmstead v. United States,
The makers of our Constitution . . . conferred, as against the
Government, the right to be let alone—the most comprehensive of
rights and the right most valued by civilized men. To protect that
right, every unjustifiable intrusion by the Government upon the
privacy of the individual, whatever the means employed, must be
deemed a violation of the Fourth Amendment.180

Justice Brandeis’s dissenting opinion ultimately persevered:
Olmstead was overturned by Katz v. United States.181
176

Id. The text of the Fourth Amendment reads as two commands; the first
secures a certain right from being violated, while the second limits the conditions
under which a warrant is issued. Id. at 158.
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the
persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
177
See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 173, at 802-04.
178
Orin S. Kerr, Applying the Fourth Amendment to the Internet: A General
Approach, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1005, 1009 (2010).
179
See City of Ontario v. Quon, 130 S. Ct. 2619, 2635 (2010) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“Applying the Fourth Amendment to new technologies may sometimes be
difficult, but when it is necessary to decide a case we have no choice. The Court’s
implication . . . that where electronic privacy is concerned we should decide less than
we otherwise would . . . or that we should hedge our bets by concocting case-specific
standards or issuing opaque opinions-is in my view indefensible. The-times-they-are-achangin’ is a feeble excuse for disregard of duty.”). But see Kerr, supra note 173, at 805
(“challeng[ing] the popular view of the Fourth Amendment[’s]” role in new technologies
as “romantic but somewhat inaccurate” and arguing against an “aggressive” judiciary).
180
Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
181
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) (“Thus, although a closely
divided Court supposed in Olmstead that surveillance without any trespass and
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Accordingly, the Supreme Court expanded the interpretation of
Fourth Amendment rights to “protect[] people, not places.”182
The Fourth Amendment, before Katz, was connected to
real property law and was generally understood to protect
183
those rights. This literal interpretation did not recognize a
violation “unless there ha[d] been an official search and seizure
of his person, or such a seizure of his papers or his tangible
material effects, or an actual physical invasion of his house ‘or
184
In the
curtilage’ for the purpose of making a seizure.”
physical world, concrete distinctions exist that facilitate and
185
The physical sphere
guide Fourth Amendment analysis.
creates logical barriers that divide activity and objects in the
186
This foundational
open from those behind closed doors.
187
distinction between inside and outside naturally draws the
line distinguishing permissible police conduct from
impermissible surveillance.
B.

Parsing Fourth Amendment Application

Despite the criticism of Katz since it was decided over
four decades ago, it remains the dominant view in Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence.188 The “reasonable expectation of
privacy” test derived from Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion
has been described as “the touchstone of the modern Fourth
without the seizure of any material object fell outside the ambit of the Constitution, we
have since departed from the narrow view on which that decision rested.”).
182
Id. at 351.
183
Joshua L. Simmons, Note, Buying You: The Government’s Use of FourthParties to Launder Data About “The People,” 2009 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 950, 961; Kerr,
supra note 173, at 809-10 (offering the relationship between the concepts, “reasonable
expectation of privacy” and “the right to exclude,” as proof that “a strong and
underappreciated connection exists between the modern Fourth Amendment and real
property law”).
184
Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 466.
185
Kerr, supra note 178, at 1009.
186
A practical example of this theory contains the following reasoning,
The inside/outside distinction operates sensibly in a physical investigation
governed by human eyesight. . . . The officer can use the surveillance tool of his
eyes to see what is there. In contrast, closed spaces are closed from visual
observation. . . . To see what is behind the barrier, the officer needs to break
into the house, jimmy open the car trunk, unseal the letter, or otherwise break
through the physical barrier that blocks his eyes from being able to see
evidence inside.
Id. at 1011.
187

Id. (declaring the distinction between government surveillance outside
versus inside as the foundational distinction in Fourth Amendment law).
188
For an expanded discussion of the criticism that the Katz standard is either
“too protective or not protective enough,” see Simmons, supra note 183, at 961-62.
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Amendment.”189 Courts apply the test to new technologies in an
effort to ascertain the reach of Fourth Amendment protection.190
However, there is still relatively scarce case law on how the
Fourth Amendment definitively “applies to government
surveillance of Internet communications,” and whatever case
law does exist “is presently highly unsettled.”191 Lawrence
Lessig challenges, “When the ability to search without burden
increases, does the government’s power to search increase as
well? Or, more darkly, as James Boyle puts it: ‘Is freedom
inversely related to the efficiency of the available means of
surveillance?’ For if it is . . . then ‘we have much to fear.’”192
Lessig’s query provides an apt segue to discuss the USCIS’s
presence on social media; to that end, Fourth Amendment
analysis serves as a useful framework for determining what
privacy interests are at stake, if any.
1. The Two-Fold Requirement for Privacy Recognition
Justice Harlan’s concurring opinion in Katz accepted the
majority’s proposition that Fourth Amendment protection is
aimed at individuals, but questioned “what protection it affords
to those [individuals].”193 Harlan stated, “My understanding of
the rule that has emerged from prior decisions is that there is a
twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an
actual (subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the
expectation be one that society is prepared to recognize as
‘reasonable.’”194 For a violation of Fourth Amendment rights to
result, both inquiries in the two-step analysis “must be
answered in the affirmative.”195
2. Creating Parallels to Justice Harlan’s Framework
The first prong of Harlan’s reasonableness test, whether
a person had an actual subjective expectation of privacy, has
been expressed as “whether the individual has shown that ‘he
189

Kerr, supra note 173, at 808 (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. A problem with the “reasonable expectation of privacy” test is its
circular nature. Id. Only when a court rules to extend Fourth Amendment protection
does an individual’s expectation of privacy then become reasonable. Id.
191
WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., 2 CRIM. PROC. § 4.4(a) (2010).
192
LESSIG, supra note 174, at 22.
193
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
194
Id.
195
Matthew J. Hodge, The Fourth Amendment and Privacy Issues on the
“New” Internet: Facebook.com and MySpace.com, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 95, 100 (2006).
190
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seeks to preserve [something] as private.’”196 In attempting to
apply these principles to a social network user’s profile,197 it has
been cautioned that the mere action of joining a social network
and creating a member profile inherently runs contrary to any
expectation of privacy.198 An individual does not have any
obligation to post information, pictures, or even sign up in the
first place.199 Furthermore, popular social networks such as
Facebook and Twitter make certain identifying information
publicly available and require subscriber action to limit
automatic, unrestricted accessibility to the rest.200 Also, unlike
other correspondence, the aforementioned sites are intended to
convey information to more than one person, which separates
them from analyses of other forms of online correspondence,
such as e-mail.201 Thus, in order for a user to prove a subjective
expectation of privacy, he must first rebut the overwhelming
presumption that he intended to make his information public.202
a. Limited Profiles
The case for a subjective expectation of privacy, if one
exists, is strengthened when a user has taken active measures
to restrict who may see his profile, arguably taking his profile
out of plain sight of law enforcement.203 By having the
forethought to place privacy controls on his profile, a user can
communicate, to some extent, his intentions to keep the

196

Id. at 106 (quoting Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (majority opinion)).
For example, a determination of whether an individual retains a subjective
expectation of privacy in a photograph posted to a social networking site would
necessarily incorporate multiple factors. Daniel Findlay, Tag! Now You’re Really “It”:
What Photographs on Social Networking Sites Mean for the Fourth Amendment, 10
N.C. J.L. & TECH. 171, 188 (2008). Such factors include:
197

whether the photograph’s subject even has knowledge of the photograph’s
existence, where the photograph was taken, who took the photograph, who
posted the photograph, what device was used, what activities are documented
in the photograph, why was the photograph taken, and the online privacy
settings of both the uploader and the subject.
Id.
198

Hodge, supra note 195, at 106.
Id. at 106-07.
200
See, e.g., Data Use Policy, FACEBOOK, http://www.facebook.com/full_data_
use_policy (last visited Nov. 3, 2011); Twitter Privacy Policy, TWITTER,
https://twitter.com/privacy (last visited Nov. 3, 2011) (“What you say on Twitter may be
viewed all around the world instantly.”).
201
Hodge, supra note 195, at 107.
202
Id.
203
See discussion of “plain view” doctrine, infra Part VI.B.2.b.
199
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information he posts private.204 It has been suggested that this
phenomenon of the limited profile creates a unique quandary in
that a user is taking steps to share information with select
people that he could convey by more private means—such as email—but he is also deliberately choosing not to share that
information with everyone.205
b. Possible Pitfalls for Citizenship Applicants: The
Exceptions
In the development of Fourth Amendment legal theory,
an exception to Fourth Amendment privacy rights was carved
out for items “in plain view.”206 As Justice Harlan explained in
his Katz concurrence, “objects, activities, or statements that he
exposes to the ‘plain view’ of outsiders are not ‘protected’ because
no intention to keep them to himself has been exhibited.”207 In
the context of social networking sites, law enforcement officials
need only provide an e-mail address to register and have access
to all public profiles and whatever information on limited
profiles the user has not restricted.208 Consequently, even if an
individual were able to demonstrate a subjective expectation of
privacy in a user profile, the plain view doctrine would seem to
undermine any potential defense.209
In addition to the plain view doctrine, another Fourth
Amendment exception occurs when a person has voluntarily
divulged information or consented to a search by the police.210
Even if the police officer is undercover, Fourth Amendment
protection will no longer apply.211 Furthermore, an individual
also assumes the risk that information shared with third parties
could be conveyed to the police.212 The consent exception,

204

See Hodge, supra note 195, at 110.
See id. at 110.
206
Id. at 108 (“However, even if a person could show an actual expectation of
privacy, an exception to the warrant requirement of the Fourth Amendment applies
when an object is in ‘plain view.’”); Findlay, supra note 197, at 196.
207
Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring).
208
For an in-depth explanation of the mechanics of social networking sites
and privacy policies, see generally Findlay, supra note 197.
209
Hodge, supra note 195, at 109.
210
See Findlay, supra note 197, at 195.
211
Hodge, supra note 195, at 111 (citing Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966)).
212
Id. at 111-12 (citing United States v. Matlock, 415 U.S. 164 (1974)). A
spreadsheet compiled by the EFF helpfully aggregates popular websites’ policies on
releasing information to law enforcement. Spreadsheet, Social Media—A Guide to the Law
Enforcement Guides, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/files/EFF_Social_
Network_Law_Enforcement_Guides-sprdsht.pdf.
205
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therefore, further erodes the Fourth Amendment analysis,
especially when combined with the plain view doctrine.
c. The Objective Prong as a Societal Barometer
Assuming the first prong of the reasonableness test were
viable, a second hurdle must still be overcome with the objective
prong of the test. Not everything that transpires online should
be vulnerable to government intrusion; “‘[t]he government may
not simply throw up its hands and err on the side of liberally
granting its employees access to a wide range of data with the
effect of losing the Fourth Amendment somewhere in
cyberspace.’”213 The objective expectation of privacy translates to a
determination of what society is prepared to honor as private
from government surveillance.214 Considering the current
attitudes toward215—and relevant case law concerning—
communications over the Internet, this finding would be
unlikely.216 In conclusion, even if there is no privacy interest in
social networking data that society is prepared to accept as
reasonable, and no subjective privacy interest that courts are
willing to give legal relevance, the federal government should still
be faithful to the spirit of the Fourth Amendment and the goals of
transparency and be more forthcoming about its practices.
CONCLUSION
Based on overblown estimates of attempts to defraud the
United States government through sham marriages, Congress
used its expansive power over immigration matters to correct
what was presented as a grave problem in the administration of
existing regulations. The product of irrational fears of marriage
fraud schemes, the Immigration Marriage Fraud Amendments of
1986 caused more problems than they solved. This note argued
that the IMFA amounted to a devaluation of the family unit,
casting a distrustful and cynical eye where familial unification
had once been a main policy goal of immediate relative
213

Hodge, supra note 195, at 101 (quoting Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union v. U.S.
Customs Serv., 307 U.S. App. D.C. 173, 184 (D.C. Cir. 1994)).
214
See, e.g., Findlay, supra note 197, at 191.
215
See id. at 198 (suggesting that as the number and relative sophistication of
Internet users increase, user generated content, such as photographs posted on social
networking sites, will be considered wholly public communications).
216
Id. at 192 (suggesting an upheaval of current “awkward analogies to 20th
Century objects and communications” if an objective expectation of privacy is ever to be
found in the social networking context).
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immigration. Where state law respected the sanctity of the
marital relationship, immigration law intruded and imposed
antiquated American mores. Consequently, this note explored the
historical definition of “family” and its relation, or lack thereof, to
current demographics. This note also discussed the normative
repercussions of the disunity between American society in reality
versus the ideal imposed upon citizen-spouse petitioners.
The second half of this note focused on USCIS
documents disclosed in response to a FOIA request that detail
the agency’s surveillance of social networking sites. The ease
with which government officials are able to access personal
information on the Internet served as a precautionary tale for
citizenship petitioners. The ramifications for marital privacy
rights of the citizen spouse were subsequently evaluated.
Finally, it was theorized that the privacy concerns raised by
government intrusion into areas petitioners may expect to be
private echoed debates over Fourth Amendment treatment of
emergent technologies.
Let us return to the story of Patricia and Saïd. The
system, as it currently operates, has failed them; there are a
few proposals, however, that could allow them a happier
ending. First, if the USCIS publicly stated its policies on
Internet surveillance, including those pertaining to social
media, it would diminish much of the privacy invasion Patricia
felt at being asked about her Facebook profile. Government
transparency would also remove much of the debate from the
constitutional privacy arena. Further, perhaps the visibility of
these policies would give rise to a discourse on online versus
physical world identities and the possible misinterpretations
that can result from disharmonies therein. Patricia was not
trying to assert on Facebook that she was not in a relationship;
rather, Saïd is not a member of the site and anyone she cares
about would already know she is in a loving marriage—there is
no need to broadcast that fact on her profile.
Also, if the government is pursuing efforts to modernize
its investigations, then it should update the definition of
“family” imposed on cross-cultural couples. Not only is it
illogical to require Patricia and Saïd to conform to an ideal that
does not match any of the American couples around them, but
it also communicates value judgments that have no place in the
marital context. Many American couples today do not comingle
their finances or assets; thus, outdated and nearsighted
requests for documents such as joint bank statements should
not be accorded the significance they currently import.
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Although these suggestions are not exhaustive, they do propose
minor remedies that in combination can have a remarkable
effect on attitudes about government treatment of immigrants
and their place in the American family.
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